MARTLAND,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
learned
President
of
the
Exchequer
Court,
which
dismissed
the
appellant’s
appeal
against
re-assessment
of
its
income
tax
for
the
year
1952.
It
relates
solely
to
the
amount
of
$10,488.25,
being
a
part
of
the
amount
of
$17,123.57
included
in
the
final
assessment
for
that
year
as
interest
upon
the
appellant’s
unpaid
income
tax.
The
facts
are
contained
in
an
agreed
statement
of
facts.
On
June
30,
1953,
within
the
time
limited
by
The
Income
Tax
Act
for
filing
its
income
tax
return,
the
appellant
filed
its
return
for
the
period
ending
December
31,
1952.
In
the
return
the
appellant
showed
income
tax
payable
in
the
amount
of
$240,342.24,
which
was
paid.
On
July
22,
1953,
the
respondent
mailed
a
notice
of
assessment
to
the
appellant,
showing
its
income
tax
at
the
figure
which
had
been
disclosed
in
the
return.
Subsequently,
on
December
21,
1956,
the
respondent
mailed
a
notice
of
re-assessment
to
the
appellant,
showing
its
income
tax
to
be
$324,286.36.
There
were
two
subsequent
notices
of
re-assessment,
on
February
13,
1957,
and
on
July
10
of
the
same
year,
reducing
the
appellant’s
income
tax
to
$308,571.81.
The
appellant
was
charged,
for
that
portion
of
its
income
tax
which
was
not
paid
until
1957,
interest
in
the
amount
of
$17,123.57,
of
which
sum
$10,488.25
was
interest
for
the
period
from
June
30,
1954,
to
January
21,
1957.
When
the
appellant’s
income
tax
return
had
been
received
in
the
Calgary
District
Taxation
Office,
the
mathematical
computations
which
it
contained
were
checked
by
an
assessor.
The
return
was
then
handed
to
another
assessor,
who
checked
it
to
ensure
that
there
had
not
been
any
errors.
Following
this,
the
original
notice
of
assessment
was
prepared
and
mailed
to
the
appellant
on
July
22,
1953.
It
was
admitted
that
the
total
time
spent
by
the
two
assessors
working
on
this
return
prior
to
the
mailing
of
the
notice
of
assessment
would
not
exceed
fifteen
minutes.
At
the
time
the
first
assessor
performed
his
work,
he
wrote
the
letter
“R”
in
the
lower
right-hand
corner
of
the
first
page
of
the
return.
This
letter
is
an
abbreviation
of
the
word
“Review”
and,
by
marking
the
return
in
this
way,
it
was
thereby
segregated
to
ensure
that
it
would
be
subject
to
further
examination.
It
is
admitted
that
prior
to
and
at
the
time
the
notice
of
July
22,
1953,
was
mailed
it
had
been
decided
by
the
officers
and
employees
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
conduct
a
further
examination
of
the
appellant’s
return.
That
examination
was
conducted
by
another
assessor
prior
to
December
21,
1956.
His
work
consisted
in
reviewing
the
seven
exhibits
attached
to
the
return
and
the
obtaining
of
additional
information
as
to
the
appellant’s
income
for
1952
by
an
examination
of
the
appellant’s
books
and
records
and
by
interviews
with
officers
and
servants
of
the
appellant.
The
only
question
in
issue
is
as
to
whether
the
judgment
below
was
right
in
holding
that
the
original
notice,
mailed
on
July
22,
1953,
was
‘‘the
notice
of
the
original
assessment
for
the
taxation
year’’
within
the
meaning
of
Section
50(6)
of
The
Income
Tax
Act,
Statutes
of
Canada
1947-48,
c.
52,
as
amended
(later
Section
54(6)
of
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148,
and
subsequently
repealed
in
1955).
The
relevant
sections
of
The
Income
Tax
Act
are
as
follows:
“42.
(1)
The
Minister
shall,
with
all
due
despatch,
examine
each
return
of
income
and
assess
the
tax
for
the
taxation
year
and
the
interest
and
penalties,
if
any,
payable.
(2)
After
examination
of
a
return,
the
Minister
shall
send
a
notice
of
assessment
to
the
person
by
whom
the
return
was
filed.
(4)
The
Minister
may
at
any
time
assess
tax,
interest
or
penalties
and
may
(a)
at
any
time,
if
the
taxpayer
or
person
filing
the
return
has
made
any
misrepresentation
or
committed
any
fraud
in
filing
the
return
or
supplying
information
under
this
Act,
and
(b)
within
6
years
from
the
day
of
an
original
assessment
in
any
other
case,
re-assess
or
make
additional
assessments.
(5)
The
Minister
is
not
bound
by
a
return
or
information
supplied
by
or
on
behalf
of
a
taxpayer
and,
in
making
an
assessment,
may,
notwithstanding
a
return
or
information
so
supplied
or
if
no
return
has
been
filed,
assess
the
tax
payable
under
this
Part.
(6)
An
assessment
shall,
subject
to
being
varied
or
vacated
on
an
objection
or
appeal
under
this
Part
and
subject
to
a
re-assessment,
be
deemed
to
be
valid
and
binding
notwithstanding
any
error,
defect
or
omission
therein
or
in
any
proceeding
under
this
Act
relating
thereto.
50.
(6)
No
interest
under
this
section
upon
the
amount
by
which
the
unpaid
taxes
exceed
the
amount
estimated
under
section
41
is
payable
in
respect
of
the
period
beginning
12
months
after
the
day
fixed
by
this
Act
for
filing
the
return
of
the
taxpayer’s
income
upon
which
the
taxes
are
payable
or
12
months
after
the
return
was
actually
filed,
whichever
was
later,
and
ending
30
days
from
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
of
the
original
assessment
for
the
taxation
year.
’
’
The
contention
of
the
appellant
is
that,
on
the
admitted
facts,
the
notice
mailed
on
July
22,
1953,
was
a
nullity
because,
before
it
was
mailed
and
at
the
time
it
was
mailed,
it
had
been
decided
to
conduct
a
further
examination
of
the
appellant’s
return.
Until
that
intention
had
been
carried
out,
there
had
not
been
an
examination
of
the
appellant’s
return,
within
Section
42(1),
and
there
was,
therefore,
no
assessment
made
pursuant
to
that
subsection.
If
the
notice
of
July
22,
1958,
was
a
nullity,
the
notice
of
original
assessment
would
then
be
that
of
December
21,
1956,
and,
accordingly,
the
appellant,
by
virtue
of
Section
50(6),
would
not
be
liable
for
payment
of
interest
for
the
period
from
June
30,
1954,
being
the
date
twelve
months
after
the
date
fixed
for
filing
the
appellant’s
return,
to
January
21,
1957,
being
the
date
thirty
days
after
the
mailing
of
the
notice
of
December
21,
1956.
In
two
cases
decided
in
the
Exchequer
Court
in
circumstances
similar
to
the
present
one,
it
has
been
decided
that
an
assessment
made
on
the
basis
of
the
taxpayer’s
return,
subject
only
to
the
checking
of
the
computations
made
in
it,
was
an
assessment
within
the
meaning
of
The
Income
Tax
Act:
Provincial
Paper,
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1955]
Ex.
C.R.
33;
[1954]
C.T.C.
367,
and
Western
Leaseholds
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1958]
Ex.
C.R.
277
;
[1958]
C.T.C.
257.
The
appellant
does
not
take
issue
with
these
two
decisions
in
the
present
appeal,
but
seeks
to
distinguish
them
on
the
ground
that
in
the
present
case
the
evidence
established
that
the
intention
to
make
the
further
examination
of
the
appellant’s
return
existed
before
the
notice
of
July
22,
1953,
was
mailed.
The
conclusions
reached
in
the
first
of
those
two
cases
and
applied
in
the
second
are
accurately
stated
in
the
headnote
as
follows:
“Held:
That
it
is
not
for
the
Court
or
anyone
else
to
prescribe
what
the
intensity
of
the
examination
of
a
taxpayer’s
return
in
any
given
case
should
be.
That
is
exclusively
a
matter
for
the
Minister,
acting
through
his
appropriate
officers,
to
decide.
2.
That
there
is
no
standard
in
the
Act
or
elsewhere,
either
express
or
implied,
fixing
the
essential
requirements
of
an
assessment.
It
is
exclusively
for
the
Minister
to
decide
how
he
should,
in
any
given
case,
ascertain
and
fix
the
liability
of
a
taxpayer.
The
extent
of
the
investigation
he
should
make,
if
any,
is
for
him
to
decide.
3.
That
the
Minister
may
properly
decide
to
accept
a
taxpayer’s
Income
tax
return
as
a
correct
statement
of
his
taxable
income
and
merely
check
the
computations
of
tax
in
it
and
without
any
further
examination
or
investigation
fix
his
tax
liability
accordingly.
If
he
does
so
it
cannot
be
said
that
he
has
not
made
an
assessment.”
I
am
in
agreement
with
these
propositions.
Do
they
cease
to
be
applicable
if,
at
the
time
the
first
notice
was
mailed,
there
existed
an
intention
to
conduct
a
further
examination
of
the
appellant’s
return?
I
do
not
think
that
they
do.
I
cannot
agree
that
that
which
would
constitute
a
valid
assessment
if
not
accompanied
by
a
present
intention
to
conduct
a
further
examination
is
not
a
valid
assessment
if
that
intention
does
exist.
In
my
opinion
there
can
be
a
valid
assessment
made
even
though
a
further
examination
of
the
return
is
intended.
The
examination
of
the
return
which
was
made
prior
to
July
22,
1953,
was,
in
my
view,
an
examination
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
(1)
of
Section
42.
I
think
the
Minister
had
authority
under
Section
42
to
make
the
assessment
of
which
notice
was
given
on
July
22,
1953.
I
am
reinforced
in
this
conclusion
by
other
subsections
of
Section
42.
Subsection
(4)
provides
that
‘‘the
Minister
may
at
any
time
assess
tax
.
.
.”,
subsection
(5)
empowers
him
to
assess
tax
notwithstanding
a
return
and
subsection
(6)
provides
that
an
assessment
shall
be
deemed
to
be
valid
notwithstanding
any
error,
defect,
or
omission
therein
or
in
any
proceeding
under
the
Act
relating
thereto.
In
summary,
my
opinion
is
that
the
Minister
had
full
authority,
under
Section
42,
to
assess
tax
on
the
basis
of
the
taxpayer’s
return
and
thereafter,
if
he
so
decided,
to
re-assess
on
the
basis
of
a
further
examination
of
that
return.
The
time
at
which
he
decided
to
make
that
further
examination
did
not,
in
any
way,
affect
the
validity
of
the
initial
assessment
which
he
had
made
and
consequently
the
notice
of
that
initial
assessment
constituted
‘‘the
notice
of
the
original
assessment
for
the
taxation
year”
within
the
meaning
of
Section
50(6).
In
my
opinion,
therefore,
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.