Jewers,
J.:—The
accused
(herein
the"applicant")
applies
under
subsection
24(1)
of
the
Charter
for
a
stay
of
proceedings
with
respect
to
charges
of
income
tax
evasion
against
him.
The
ground
of
the
application
is
alleged
undue
delay
in
the
laying
of
the
charges
affecting
his
liberty
and
security
of
the
person
guaranteed
by
section
7
of
the
Charter.
In
March
1987,
income
tax
investigators
commenced
an
inquiry
into
the
tax
returns
of
the
applicant
for
1986
and
prior
taxation
years.
The
investigation
was
lengthy
and
complex,
involving
the
examination
of
much
documentation,
and
the
interviewing
of
many
witnesses.
On
May
19,1988
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
assessed
the
applicant
tax
of
$79,788.14
and
penalties
and
interest
of
$69,315.64
for
a
total
of
$149,103.78
respecting
the
tax
years
in
question.
On
November
24,
1988,
the
Director
of
Taxation
approved
a
recommendation
of
further
investigation
for
purposes
of
prosecution.
On
April
25,
1990,
the
charges
in
question
were
laid.
The
investigation
continued
right
up
until
the
time
the
charges
were
laid.
In
particular,
between
June
and
December
1989,
the
time
was
spent
in
analyzing,
reviewing
and
evaluating
approximately
3,500
pieces
of
financial
information
and
documentation,
which
the
investigators
had
thus
far
gathered.
Counsel
for
the
applicant
submitted
that,
as
evidenced
by
the
assessment,
the
prosecution
had
enough
evidence
to
lay
the
charges
by
May
19,
1988,
the
date
of
the
assessment,
and
that
charges
should
have
been
laid
then—not
almost
two
years
later.
However,
I
agree
with
the
submission
of
Crown
counsel
that
the
evidence
needed
to
make
a
tax
assessment
is
not
of
the
same
high
standard
required
for
a
criminal
prosecution,
and
the
fact
that
the
assessment
was
made
did
not
necessarily
mean
that
enough
evidence
had
been
gathered
to
launch
a
criminal
prosecution.
The
affidavit
evidence
presented
to
the
court
does
not
make
it
clear
when
the
prosecution
did
have
sufficient
evidence
to
lay
the
charges,
or,
indeed,
what
would
constitute
sufficient
evidence
in
the
context
of
this
case.
What
is
clear
is
that
between
the
date
of
the
assessment
and
the
date
the
charges
were
laid,
the
prosecution
actually
continued
its
investigation.
By
November
1988,
all
that
was
authorized
was
the
continuation
of
the
investigation
for
purposes
of
prosecution,
and
not
the
laying
of
charges.
It
is
reasonable
to
infer
that
the
investigators
believed
that
further
work
was
needed
to
get
enough
evidence
for
the
successful
prosecution
of
the
case.
(Certainly,
a
lot
had
to
be
done
just
to
collate
the
material
already
gathered
and
prepare
a
prosecution
report.)
It
is
also
reasonable
to
infer
that
the
investigators
were
acting
in
good
faith
and
using
their
best
judgment
as
to
what
further
research
had
to
be
carried
out
to
perfect
their
case.
I
don't
know
whether
their
additional
work
was
really
necessary,
or
not,
or
whether
they
could
as
easily
have
proceeded
in
May
1988
as
in
April
1990,
but
I
don't
think
it
is
generally
the
business
of
the
court
to
second
guess
investigative
authorities.
I
adopt
the
words
of
Dubin,
J.A.,
(as
he
then
was)
in
R.
v.
Young
(1984),
46
O.R.
(2d)
520;
13
C.C.C.
(3d)
1
(C.A.),
at
551:
Courts
cannot
undertake
the
supervision
of
the
operation
or
the
efficiency
of
police
departments
and
to
be
asked
to
determine
whether
the
police
proceeded
as
expeditiously
as
they
should
have
in
any
given
case.
Furthermore,
to
compel
the
police
or
Crown
counsel
to
institute
proceedings
before
they
have
reason
to
believe
that
they
will
be
able
to
establish
the
accused's
guilt
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt
would,
.
.
.
have
a
deleterious
effect
both
upon
the
rights
of
the
accused
and
upon
the
ability
of
society
to
protect
itself.
The
authorities
are
clear
that
the
court
may
grant
a
stay
where
compelling
an
accused
to
stand
trial
would
amount
to
an
abusive
process
through
oppres
sive
or
vexatious
proceedings;
but
that
delay
in
laying
charges
in
itself
is
not
a
basis
for
a
stay
of
process,
even
where
it
results
in
the
impairment
of
the
ability
to
make
full
answer
and
defence;
although
an
exception
would
be
where
the
delay
was
for
the
ulterior
purpose
of
depriving
an
accused
of
the
opportunity
to
make
full
answer
and
defence.
(See
R.
v.
Young,
supra,
page
551.)
In
this
case
there
is
no
reason
to
stay
the
proceedings.
The
investigation
was
continuing,
and
the
case
was
being
worked
on
until
very
shortly
before
charges
were
laid.
There
was
no
delay.
Even
if
the
interval
between
the
assessment
and
the
laying
of
charges
could
be
characterized
as
a
delay,
it
was
not
such
as
to
constitute
an
abuse:
There
was
purposeful
activity,
conducted
in
good
faith,
with
a
view
to
readying
the
case
for
prosecution,
and
not
for
any
ulterior
motive.
The
applicant
has
been,
and
is,
in
custody
on
unrelated
matters,
and
the
laying
of
the
charges
has
had
the
effect
of
delaying
the
applicant's
potential
transfer
to
a
minimum
security
setting,
but
this
is
simply
an
unfortunate
consequence
of
a
perfectly
valid
process.
There
was
no
suggestion
that
the
applicant's
ability
to
make
full
answer
and
defence
to
the
charges
was
prejudiced
in
anyway.
The
application
is
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.
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