Date: 20100618
Docket: A-443-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 162
CORAM: NADON
J.A.
SHARLOW
J.A.
LAYDEN-STEVENSON
J.A.
BETWEEN:
742190 ONTARIO INC.
COB VAN DEL MANOR NURSING
HOME
Appellant
and
CANADA CUSTOMS AND
REVENUE AGENCY
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHARLOW J.A.
[1]
742190
Ontario Inc., which until 1998 carried on a business called Van Del Manor Nursing
Homes (“Van Del Manor”), has appealed a judgment of the Federal Court (2009 FC
985) dismissing Van Del Manor’s application for an order requiring the Minister
of National Revenue to consider a number of requests for Ministerial review of certain
source deduction assessments. For the reasons that follow, I would allow the
appeal and make the order requested by Van Del Manor.
The statutory
schemes
[2]
In
the context of this case, the term “source deductions” refers to amounts that Van
Del Manor as an employer was required to withhold from remuneration paid to its
employees and remit to the federal government on account of amounts payable by
the employees as tax under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th
Supp.), contributions under the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8,
and premiums under the Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1,
and its statutory successor, the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c.
23.
[3]
It
is not clear whether the amounts in issue also include amounts payable by Van
Del Manor on its own account as the “employer’s share” of contributions under
the Canada Pension Plan and premiums under the Unemployment Insurance
Act and the Employment Insurance Act, but nothing turns on that.
[4]
The
disposition of this appeal requires an understanding of five different
statutory schemes relating to the formal determination by the Minister of an
employer’s liability for source deductions, and the procedure for challenging
such a determination. The relevant provisions of the five statutory schemes are
reproduced in appendices to these reasons:
(a) the Income
Tax Act (Appendix A),
(b) the Canada
Pension Plan Act as it read before December 18, 1997 (Appendix B),
(c) the Canada
Pension Plan as it now reads (Appendix C ),
(d) the Unemployment
Insurance Act (Appendix D), and
(e) the Employment
Insurance Act (Appendix E).
[5]
Each
of these statutory schemes is lengthy and complex, and each has some unique
provisions. However, for the purposes of this appeal it is enough to understand
four elements that these statutory schemes have in common: (1) the assessment
of the liability to pay, (2) the notification of the assessment, (3) the right
to a Ministerial review of the assessment, and (4) the right to a judicial
appeal of the assessment.
[6]
The
first common element is the assessment. The word “assessment” generally refers
to the determination by the Minister of the amount of a person’s liability, and
includes the act of making the determination and the product of the
determination (Canada v. Anchor Pointe Energy Ltd. (F.C.A.), [2008] 1
F.C.R. 839, 2007 FCA 188 at paragraph 32). The assessment may be based on a
return or report filed by the person or information obtained by the Minister
from another source. The review may be cursory (such as an administrative
processing of the person’s return or report) or it may involve an audit or a
more extensive investigation. Typically, the statute will also provide that the
notice of assessment is determinative of the amount of the liability of the
assessed person subject only to changes that may be made by a reassessment,
including a reassessment after a Ministerial review or judicial appeal.
[7]
The
second common element is the notification. Generally, the Minister has a legal
obligation to prepare a document called a notice of assessment stating the
amount of the assessment and other relevant particulars, and a legal obligation
to send the notice of assessment to the person who is obliged to pay the
assessed amount. The statute may stipulate the method by which the notice of
assessment must be sent, and may also stipulate one or more presumptions upon
which the Minister may rely if it becomes necessary to prove that the notice of
assessment was sent.
[8]
The
third common element is the right of the person assessed to request a review of
the assessment by the Minister (for assessments under the Income Tax Act,
this is referred to as a right to object). The statute stipulates the period
within which that right must be exercised, and may provide that the limitation
period may be extended. The statute may also state one or more presumptions that
may be made if it becomes necessary to prove the date of the commencement of
the limitation period.
[9]
The
fourth common element is the right of the person assessed to appeal the
assessment, or in other words to have the Tax Court of Canada determine the
correctness of the assessment. The Tax Court has no jurisdiction to consider an
appeal of an assessment unless the person assessed has validly exercised the
right to request a Ministerial review or, in the case of an income tax
assessment, to object (Bormann v. Canada, 2006 FCA 83).
Facts
[10]
In
January of 2007, Van Del Manor submitted over 90 notices of objection to the
Minister relating to assessments made in the years 1991 to 1998 in relation to
source deductions. Most of the notices of objection related to assessments
under the Income Tax Act, but 43 of them were intended as requests for
Ministerial review of source deduction assessments under the Canada Pension
Plan, the Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Employment
Insurance Act. Those 43 requests were submitted in the form used for objections
to income tax assessments, but nothing turns on that. Van Del Manor was seeking
the Ministerial review of those 43 assessments on the basis of what are said to
be reconstructed notices of assessment provided by the Minister in October of
2006.
[11]
The
computer records maintained by the Canada Revenue Agency apparently indicate
that in the years 1991 to 1998 there were 43 source deduction assessments of Van
Del Manor under the Canada Pension Plan, the Unemployment Insurance
Act, and the Employment Insurance Act. There is also evidence that,
in the course of various proceedings over the years, Van Del Manor had become
aware of the amount of the liabilities the Minister was claiming from Van Del
Manor for source deductions, interest and penalties. However, the evidence of Van
Del Manor was that, prior to October of 2006, it had not received, and its
principals and directors had not seen, notices of assessment made in the years 1991
to 1998. That evidence is not contradicted. The Minister has provided no
evidence that notices of the 43 assessments were sent to Van Del Manor, by mail
or otherwise, before October of 2006.
[12]
Counsel
for Van Del Manor indicated at the oral hearing that Van Del Manor is not
contesting its liability to pay the amount assessed as source deductions, but
wishes to challenge its liability for the related interest and penalties. In
particular, Van Del Manor seeks to assert a due diligence defence to the
imposition of penalties.
[13]
I
note parenthetically that the affidavit of Serge Nadeau sworn June 11, 2008,
which was submitted by the Minister in the Federal Court, indicates that the
directors of Van Del Manor, Mr. Stainton Pinnock and Ms. Stella Pinnock, had
been assessed for the unpaid source deductions but successfully appealed those
assessments to the Tax Court of Canada (the judgments are dated October 6, 2004
in Tax Court files 2001-3014(IT)G and 2001-3013(IT)G; the reasons for judgment
are not in the record and apparently are not reported). The Tax Court judgments
relieved the directors of personal liability for employee source deductions but
did not affect the liability of Van Del Manor.
[14]
The
requests for Ministerial review in relation to the Canada Pension Plan,
the Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Employment Insurance Act
were referred to a delegate of the Minister, who declined to consider them on
their merits, because she concluded that they were submitted outside the applicable
limitation periods. That decision was communicated to Van Del Manor by letter
dated March 22, 2007.
[15]
The
income tax objections apparently were also rejected, presumably by a different
delegate of the Minister. Nevertheless they are now properly before the Tax
Court of Canada, for reasons
that are explained under the next heading.
Proceedings
in the Tax Court of Canada
[16]
After
learning of the Minister’s decisions not to consider the requests for
Ministerial review or the objections, Van Del Manor filed notices of appeal in
the Tax Court of Canada.
[17]
The
Minister moved for an order quashing the appeals for want of jurisdiction,
based on two alternative grounds. The Minister’s principal argument was that
the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeals because Van Del
Manor had not objected or sought Ministerial review of the assessments within
the statutory time limits. The Minister’s alternative argument was that the
Minister’s decision to reject the objections and requests for Ministerial
review was in fact a refusal to determine the merits which could be challenged
only by way of an application to the Federal Court for judicial review.
[18]
The
Minister’s motion to quash the appeals was dismissed in relation to the income
tax assessments, but granted in respect of the assessments under the Canada
Pension Plan, the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Employment
Insurance Act (741290 Ontario Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2008
TCC 55). (Counsel for Van Del Manor informed the Court at the hearing of this
appeal that the income tax appeals have been heard in the Tax Court and are
under reserve.)
[19]
The
Tax Court judge, in considering the motion to quash, reasoned that the disposition
of the motion turned on whether Van Del Manor had made its objections and
requests for Ministerial review within the statutory limitation period. In all
cases the limitation period was 90 days but in his analysis, the limitation
period began in some cases when the person assessed was notified of the
assessment but in other cases, when the notice of assessment was mailed.
Specifically, the Tax Court judge concluded as follows:
(a) the date
of notification rule applied to:
(i)
a
request for Ministerial review under section 27.1 of what I will call the “new”
Canada Pension Plan (the Canada Pension Plan as amended effective
December 18, 1997 by S.C. 1997, c. 40, s. 65), and
(ii)
a
request for Ministerial review under section 92 of the Employment Insurance
Act (which came into effect on June 30, 1996); and
(b) the date
of mailing rule applied to:
(i)
an
objection under the Income Tax Act;
(ii)
a
request for Ministerial review under subsection 27(2) of what I will call the
“old” Canada Pension Plan (that is, the Canada Pension Plan as it
read before December 18, 1997),
(iii) a request for
Ministerial review under the Unemployment Insurance Act (which was in effect
before June 30, 1996).
[20]
With
respect to the assessments to which the date of notification rule
applied, the Tax Court judge concluded that, by 2005 at the latest, Van Del
Manor had sufficient knowledge of the contents of the assessments to constitute
notification. On that basis he concluded that the January 2007 requests for
Ministerial review were out of time in relation to assessments under the new Canada
Pension Plan (namely, assessments that the Minister says were made on or
after December 18, 1997) and the Employment Insurance Act (namely, assessments
that the Minister says were made on or after June 30, 1996). The appeals of those
assessments were quashed for want of jurisdiction. As against Van Del Manor,
that was a final judgment that Van Del Manor could have appealed to the Federal
Court of Appeal, but did not. Van Del Manor accepts that it has no further
remedies in relation to the assessments under the new Canada Pension Plan
or the Employment Insurance Act.
[21]
With
respect to the assessments to which the date of mailing rule applied, the
Tax Court judge noted the jurisprudence establishing that the burden is on the
Minister to prove that the assessments were mailed. He concluded that the
Minister had not met that burden. The Tax Court judge said that he would have
dismissed the Minister’s motion to quash the appeals relating to the
assessments that were subject to the date of mailing rule, but for the
Minister’s alternative argument that the Minister had not made a decision that
could be appealed to the Tax Court at all.
[22]
The
Tax Court judge rejected that argument for the income tax assessments because
paragraph 169(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act provides for a right of
appeal where the Minister makes no decision. However, he accepted it for
assessments under the old Canada Pension Plan and the Unemployment
Insurance Act, because neither of those statutes has an analogous provision.
[23]
In
accepting the Minister’s alternative argument in relation to the assessments
under the old Canada Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act,
the Tax Court judge was following Power v. Minister of National Revenue,
2005 TCC 200, in which Justice Bowie held that a decision of the Minister to
reject a request for Ministerial review because it is filed late is not a
decision that can be appealed to the Tax Court. He characterized such a
decision as a refusal to decide, which can be challenged only by way of an
application to the Federal Court for judicial review. In my view, the
correctness of the principle in Power is an open question. However, the
correctness of the Power case was not argued in this appeal.
[24]
The
Tax Court judge concluded his reasons by suggesting to Van Del Manor that only
the Federal Court has the jurisdiction to grant a remedy for the Minister’s
refusal to review an assessment. Van Del Manor accepted that suggestion, as
described under the next heading.
Proceedings
in the Federal Court
[25]
Van
Del Manor commenced an application for judicial review in the Federal Court in relation
to the requests for Ministerial review of the assessments under the old Canada
Pension Plan (the assessments the Minister says were made before December
18, 1997) and under the Unemployment Insurance Act (the assessments the
Minister says were made before June 30, 1996). Van Del Manor sought among other
things an order compelling the Minister to consider the requests for
Ministerial review on their merits.
[26]
In
opposing the application for judicial review, the Minister invited the Federal
Court judge to conclude, contrary to the decision of the Tax Court judge, that
the requests for Ministerial review of assessments under the old Canada
Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act were filed late. The
Minister’s argument was based on authorities not cited to the Tax Court judge,
including sections 43 and 44 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, C.
I-21, and some cases. The Federal Court judge agreed that the requests for
Ministerial review were filed late and dismissed Van Del Manor’s application
for judicial review on that basis.
Issues on appeal
(a) Issue estoppel and
abuse of process
[27]
Van
Del Manor argues that the Minister is barred by the doctrines of issue estoppel
or abuse of process from arguing in the Federal Court that the requests for Ministerial
review were filed late. The Minister argues that those doctrines have no
application in this case because the issues in the Tax Court were not the same
as the issues in the Federal Court, and because the Minister was barred from
appealing the Tax Court judgment because it was an interlocutory judgment in an
informal proceeding (see subsection 27(1.2) of the Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7).
[28]
The
doctrine of issue estoppel was well summarized by Justice Malone, writing for
this Court in Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co. (C.A.), [2003] 1 F.C. 242.
I reproduce here the relevant excerpts from that summary (my emphasis):
(¶26)
Issue estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of an issue which has been
conclusively and finally decided in previous litigation between the same
parties or their privies [Angle v. M.N.R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248 and Grandview (Town of) v. Doering [1976] 2
S.C.R. 621]. It applies not only to issues decided finally and conclusively,
but also to arguments that could have been raised by a party in exercise of
reasonable diligence (Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb,
[1966] 1 Q.B. 630 (C.A.); Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc. (1999), 5
C.P.R. (4th) 363 (F.C.A.)). Issue estoppel applies where an issue
has been decided in one action between the parties, and renders that decision
conclusive in a later action between the same parties, notwithstanding that the
cause of action may be different (Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation,
[1926] A.C. 155 (P.C.); Minott v. O’Shanter Development Co. (1999), 42
O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.)). The second cause of action, however, must involve issues
of fact or law which were decided as a fundamental step in the logic of the prior
decision. Issue estoppel does not arise if the question arose collaterally or
incidentally in the earlier proceedings. The test for such an inquiry is
whether the determination on which it is sought to found the estoppel is so
fundamental to the substantive decision that the latter cannot stand without
the former (Angle, supra; R. v. Duhamel (1981), 33 A.R. 271 (C.A.), affirmed
by [1984] 2 S.C.R. 555).
(¶27)
In the words of Moir J.A. in Duhamel, supra, adopted by Lamer C.J. on
appeal, “[t]his contemplates the premise that the prior decision could not have
been obtained without the point in issue being resolved in favour of the party
urging the estoppel” (Duhamel, supra, at 278). In essence, this
statement is merely an affirmation of the principles articulated by Dickson J.
in Angle, supra, in 1974. This does not necessarily imply, however, that
the issue must have been the main point or ratio decidendi of the first
decision, but rather that resolution of the issue is an essential element of
the logic or reasoning behind it (Iron v. Saskatchewan (Minister of
Environment and Public Safety), [1993] 6 W.W.R. 1 (Sask. C.A.) at page 11).
The decision which is said to give rise to the estoppel need not be a decision
which determines the entire subject-matter of the litigation. The test for
issue estoppel is a substantive issue test where the decision affects
substantive rights of the parties with respect to a matter bearing on the
merits of the cause of action (see D. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in
Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 78).
…
(¶29)
Finality in litigation is the paramount policy concern; a party should not be
vexed twice for resolution of an issue already decided conclusively. A litigant
should have only “one bite at the cherry” (Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies
Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460 at paragraphs. 18-19; Hoystead, supra)....
[29]
In
my view, this is a case where either the doctrine of issue estoppel, or the
broader doctrine of abuse of process, should have barred the Minister from
asserting in the Federal Court that the Ministerial review requests in issue
were filed late. The issue of timeliness had been determined conclusively in
Van Del Manor’s favour by the Tax Court judge, in a proceeding involving the
same parties and the same facts as the application for judicial review heard by
the Federal Court judge. As between these parties and in relation to the
assessments in issue, the Minister and Van Del Manor should be bound by the Tax
Court judge’s conclusion that the requests for Ministerial review of the
assessments under the old Canada Pension Plan and the Unemployment
Insurance Act were not filed late.
[30]
In
my view, it is not relevant that the Minister could not appeal the decision of
the Tax Court. Parliament has chosen to deny parties the right to appeal an
interlocutory judgment of the Tax Court in matters heard under the informal
procedure of that Court. That is a legislative policy choice that necessarily
entails the prospect that such a decision of the Tax Court is binding as between
the parties, whether or not it is correct in law. The Minister chose to bring an
interlocutory motion to quash the appeals of Van Del Manor, thus risking a decision
that could not be appealed. It would have been open to the Minister to plead the
jurisdiction issue in its reply to the notices of appeal so that the question
of jurisdiction could be determined in the final judgment. Having chosen the
litigation strategy it did, the Minister cannot fairly complain of the
consequences.
[31]
For
these reasons, I would allow the appeal of Van Del Manor from the judgment of the
Federal Court judge and set aside his judgment. In the interest of judicial
economy, I will not refer this matter back to the Federal Court. Instead I will
consider the application for judicial review de novo.
[32]
The
issue raised in Van Del Manor’s application for judicial review is whether the
Minister should be compelled to consider, on their merits, Van Del Manor’s
requests for Ministerial review of source deduction assessments under the old Canada
Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act, given that the
requests were made on a timely basis. As the main remedy sought by Van Del
Manor is an order in the nature of mandamus, the principles to be
applied are those set out in Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (C.A.),
[1994] 1 F.C. 742, at pages 766-9.
[33]
In
my view, a fair application of those principles compels the following
conclusions: (1) The Minister has a public duty to review an assessment when
requested on a timely basis to do so. (2) Given that the requests for review in
this case were timely, Van Del Manor has a clear right to performance of that
duty. (3) The Minister has no discretion to decline to review the assessments.
(4) Van Del Manor has no adequate alternative remedy. In this context, the
remedy of a waiver is not adequate because it is granted only at the discretion
of the Minister. (5) It cannot be said that the requested review is without
merit, because the income tax appeals that have apparently proceeded on the
same or similar grounds have been heard by the Tax Court and are under reserve.
(6) There is no equitable bar to relief. The Minister cannot rely on the
doctrine of laches to preclude a Ministerial review that is made on a
timely basis. Nor does the fact that Van Del Manor has previously requested
waivers of interest and penalties necessarily mean that Van Del Manor has
conceded that they were correctly assessed. There is no evidence that a waiver
cannot be requested without such a concession, or that the Minister notified
Van Del Manor that the making of a waiver request would be construed as a
concession.
[34]
I
conclude that it would be appropriate in this case to make an order requiring
the Minister to review the source deduction assessments that are the subject of
Van Del Manor’s application for judicial review, namely, the assessments made
under the old Canada Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act.
(b) Alternatively, were
the requests for Ministerial review filed late?
[35]
Even
if the issue of late filing had been properly raised in the Federal Court, I
would have concluded that the appeal should be allowed because the record
cannot reasonably support the factual conclusion that the requests for
Ministerial review of the source deduction assessments made under the old Canada
Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act were filed late.
[36]
The
statutory obligation of the Minister in relation to those assessments must be
determined on the basis of the statutes in force when, according to the
Minister, the assessments were made. The Minister has asserted from the outset
and still asserts that the assessments in issue were made before December 18,
1997 (in the case of the assessments under the old Canada Pension Plan)
and before June 30, 1996 (in the case of assessments under the Unemployment
Insurance Act). As the Tax Court judge correctly concluded, those
provisions obliged the Minister to notify the assessed person of the
assessments by mailing notices of assessment. The Minister to this day has not
produced evidence that the notices of assessment were mailed to Van Del Manor when
the assessments were made, or at any time thereafter.
[37]
The
Minister has argued that, by virtue of amendments to the Canada Pension Plan
effective December 18, 1997, and by virtue of the repeal of the Unemployment
Insurance Act on June 30, 1996 and the enactment of the Employment
Insurance Act on that date, the statutory limitation period for a request
for Ministerial review of an assessment does not commence on the date of the
mailing of the notice of assessment, but on the date on which the person
assessed is “notified” of the assessments. I need not determine whether this
argument is correct. For the purposes of this appeal I will assume without
deciding that it is.
[38]
In
the context of the relevant statutory schemes, a person is “notified” of an
assessment when the Minister provides the person with information equivalent to
the substantive contents of a notice of assessment. The record before this
Court discloses no evidence that the Minister provided Van Del Manor with that
information at any time before October of 2006, when the reconstructed notices
of assessment were created and given to Van Del Manor.
[39]
The
Minister cites a number of other proceedings taken by Van Del Manor in seeking
relief from the assessments in issue, in particular a series of waiver
requests, in support of the contention that notification occurred in 2005 at
the latest. However, the Minister has not provided the documentary foundation for
any of those waiver requests. They may well have been based on statements of
account or documents relating to enforcement proceedings, none of which are in
the record, which may or may not have contained the same substantive
information as notices of assessment.
Conclusion
[40]
For
these reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs and set aside the judgment
of the Federal Court. Making the judgment that should have been made, I would
allow Van Del Manor’s application for judicial review with costs and order the
Minister to consider Van Del Manor’s requests for Ministerial review of source
deduction assessments made under the Canada Pension Plan before December
18, 1997 and under the Unemployment Insurance Act before June 30, 1996,
on the basis that they were not filed late. Costs will be assessed on the
ordinary scale, that is, under Column III of Tariff B of the Federal Courts
Rules.
Postscript
[41]
At the
conclusion of the hearing of this appeal, the panel advised counsel that
judgment was reserved. The next day, counsel for the Minister submitted to the
Court a letter containing a new argument in support of his submission against
the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel. The new argument is that
according to section 18.28 of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. T-2, a judgment of the Tax Court under the informal procedure (as was the
decision of The Tax Court judge in this case) has no precedential value.
Counsel for Van Del Manor wrote a letter to the Court in response, objecting to
this new argument being raised in this manner but nevertheless submitting that
section 18.28 of the Tax Court of Canada Act cannot be interpreted as a
limitation to the doctrines of issue estoppel or abuse of process.
[42]
Counsel
sometimes becomes aware of a new authority or new argument after the conclusion
of oral argument on appeal. If judgment has not yet been rendered and the new
point is considered important enough to raise despite the fact that the oral
hearing has been concluded, the correct procedure is to consult with counsel
for the other party or parties to see if agreement can be reached on whether
the new point should be raised, and on a method of raising it that permits a
formal response from the other party or parties if they consider a response is
necessary. Failing agreement, the party seeking to raise the new point may file
a notice of motion to seek leave to raise it. Such motions are and should be
rare, and will not be granted without good reason.
[43]
This Court
normally would not entertain a new argument raised by letter as counsel for the
Minister has done in this case unless all parties had consented. However, I
propose in this case to make an exception because the point is easily dealt
with and my conclusion favours Van Del Manor.
[44]
I agree
with counsel for Van Del Manor on the meaning of section 18.28 of the Tax
Court of Canada Act. To say that a judgment has no precedential value means
that it does not state the law so as to be binding in a future case. A judgment
may for any number of reasons have no precedential value, but even so it is binding
on the parties and may prevent either party from attempting to relitigate an
issue previously decided in the other party’s favour on the same facts.
“K.
Sharlow”
“I
agree
M.
Nadon J.A.”
“I
agree
Carolyn
Layden-Stevenson J.A.”
APPENDIX A
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th
Supp.)
Subsection 165 (1) and (3) (Division I of
Part 1)
|
165. (1) A
taxpayer who objects to an assessment under this Part may serve on the
Minister a notice of objection, in writing, setting out the reasons for the objection
and all relevant facts,
...
(b) in any other
case, on or before the day that is 90 days after the day of mailing of the
notice of assessment.
...
(3) On receipt of a notice of objection
under this section, the Minister shall, with all due dispatch, reconsider the
assessment and vacate, confirm or vary the assessment
or reassess, and shall thereupon notify
the taxpayer in writing of the Minister’s action.
|
165. (1) Le
contribuable qui s’oppose à une cotisation prévue par la présente partie peut
signifier au ministre, par écrit, un avis d’opposition exposant les motifs de
son opposition et tous les faits pertinents, dans les délais suivants :
[...]
b) dans les
autres cas, au plus tard le 90e jour suivant la date de mise à la
poste de l’avis de cotisation.
[...]
(3) Sur réception de l’avis
d’opposition, le ministre, avec diligence, examine de nouveau la cotisation
et l’annule, la ratifie ou la modifie ou établit une nouvelle
cotisation. Dès lors, il avise le
contribuable de sa décision par écrit.
|
Subsection 169 (1) (Division I of Part 1)
|
169. (1) Where a
taxpayer has served notice of objection to an assessment under section 165,
the taxpayer may appeal to the Tax Court of Canada to have the assessment
vacated or varied after either
(a) the Minister
has confirmed the assessment or reassessed, or
(b) 90 days have
elapsed after service of the notice of objection and the Minister has
not
notified the taxpayer that the Minister has vacated or confirmed the
assessment or reassessed,
but
no appeal under this section may be instituted after the expiration of 90
days from the day notice has been mailed to the taxpayer under section 165
that the Minister has confirmed the assessment or reassessed.
|
169. (1) Lorsqu’un
contribuable a signifié un avis d’opposition à une cotisation, prévu à
l’article 165, il peut interjeter appel auprès de la Cour canadienne de
l’impôt pour faire annuler ou modifier la cotisation:
a) après que le
ministre a ratifié la cotisation ou procédé à une nouvelle cotisation;
b) après
l’expiration des 90 jours qui suivent la signification de l’avis d’opposition
sans que le ministre ait notifié au contribuable le fait qu’il a annulé ou
ratifié la cotisation ou procédé à une nouvelle cotisation;
toutefois, nul appel prévu au présent
article ne peut être interjeté après l’expiration des 90 jours qui suivent la
date où avis a été expédié par la poste au contribuable, en vertu de
l’article 165, portant que le ministre a ratifié la cotisation ou procédé à
une nouvelle cotisation.
|
Subsection 227 (10)
|
227. (10) The Minister may at any time assess
any amount payable under
(a) subsection
227(8), 227(8.1), 227(8.2), 227(8.3) or 227(8.4) or 224(4) or 224(4.1) or
section 227.1 or 235 by a person,
...
and,
where the Minister sends a notice of assessment to that person or
partnership, Divisions I and J of Part I apply with any modifications that
the circumstances require.
|
227. (10) Le
ministre peut, en tout temps, établir une cotisation pour les montants
suivants :
a) un montant
payable par une personne en vertu des paragraphes (8), (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) ou
(8.4) ou 224(4) ou (4.1) ou des articles 227.1 ou 235;
[...]
Les sections I et J de la partie I
s’appliquent, avec les modifications nécessaires, à tout avis de cotisation que
le ministre envoie à la personne ou à la société de personnes.
|
Subsection 244 (14) and (15)
|
244. (14) For the
purposes of this Act, where any notice or notification described in
subsection 149.1(6.3), 152(3.1), 165(3) or 166.1(5) or any notice of assessment
or determination is mailed, it shall be
presumed to be mailed on the date of
that notice or notification.
(15) Where any notice of assessment or
determination has been sent by the Minister as required by this Act, the
assessment or determination is deemed to have been made on the day of mailing
of the notice of the assessment or determination.
|
244. (14) Pour
l’application de la présente loi, la date de mise à la poste d’un avis ou
d’une notification, prévus aux paragraphes 149.1(6.3), 152(3.1), 165(3) ou
166.1(5), ou d’un avis de cotisation ou de
détermination est présumée être la date
apparaissant sur cet avis ou sur cette notification.
(15) Lorsqu’un avis de cotisation ou de
détermination a été envoyé par le ministre comme le prévoit la présente loi,
la cotisation est réputée avoir été établie et le montant, déterminé à la
date de mise à la poste de l’avis de cotisation ou de détermination.
|
APPENDIX B
Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, as it
read before December 18, 1997
Subsection 22 (1) and (2)
|
22. (1) The Minister may assess an employer for
an amount payable by him under this Act, or may re-assess the employer or
make additional assessments as the circumstances require, and the expression
“assessment” when used in this Act with reference to any action so taken by
the Minister under this section includes any such re-assessment or additional
assessment.
(2)
After assessing an employer for an amount payable by him under this Act, the
Minister shall send the employer a notice of assessment, and on that notice
being sent to the employer, the assessment shall be deemed to be valid and
binding, subject to being varied or vacated on appeal under this Act, and the
employer is liable to pay to Her Majesty the amount thereof forthwith.
|
22. (1) Le
ministre peut évaluer le montant payable par un employeur aux termes de la
présente loi ou il peut réévaluer ce montant à l’égard de cet employeur ou
établir des évaluations supplémentaires selon que les circonstances
l’exigent; l’expression «évaluation», utilisée dans la présente loi
relativement à toute initiative ainsi prise par le ministre en vertu du
présent article, s’entend également d’une nouvelle évaluation ou d’une
évaluation supplémentaire.
(2) Après avoir évalué
le montant payable par un employeur aux termes de la présente loi, le
ministre envoie à l’employeur un avis d’évaluation; dès l’envoi de cet avis
à l’employeur, l’évaluation est réputée valide et obligatoire sous réserve de
modification ou d’annulation sur appel prévu par la présente loi et
l’employeur est tenu d’en payer sans délai le montant à Sa Majesté.
|
Subsection 23 (2)
|
23. (2) Section 160, subsections 161 (11) and 220
(3.1), (4) and (5), sections 221.1 and 223 to 224.3, subsections 227 (9.1)
and (10), sections 229, 236 and 244 (except subsections 244 (1) and (4)) and
subsections 248(7) and (11) of the Income Tax Act apply, with such
modifications as the circumstances require, to all contributions, interest,
penalties and other amounts payable by a person under this Act, and for the
purposes of this subsection, the reference in subsection 224 (1.2) of that
Act to “subsection 227 (10.1) or a similar provision” shall be read as a
reference to “section 22 of the Canada Pension Plan”.
|
23. (2)
L’article 160, les paragraphes 161 (11) et 220 (3.1), (4) et (5), les
articles 221.1 et 223 à 224.3, les paragraphes 227 (9.1) et (10), les
articles 229, 236 et 244, à l’exception des paragraphes 244(1) et (4), et les
paragraphes 248 (7) et (11) de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu s’appliquent,
avec les adaptations nécessaires, aux cotisations, intérêts, pénalités et
autres montants payables par une personne en vertu de la présente loi. Pour
l’application du présent paragraphe, le passage, au paragraphe 224 (1.2) de
cette loi, « du paragraphe 227 (10.1) ou d’une disposition
semblable » est remplacé par le passage « de l’article 22 du Régime
de pensions du Canada ».
|
Subsection 27 (2) and (5)
|
27. (2) Where the Minister has assessed an
employer for an amount payable by him under this Act, the employer or his
representative may appeal to the Minister for a reconsideration of the
assessment, either as to whether any amount should be assessed as payable or
as to the amount so assessed, within ninety days of the day of mailing of the
notice of assessment.
...
(5) On an application or an appeal under this
section, the Minister shall, with all due dispatch, determine the question
raised by the application or vacate, confirm or vary the assessment or
re-assess, and he shall thereupon notify any employee affected or his
representative and the employer or his representative.
|
27. (2) Lorsque
le ministre a évalué le montant payable par un employeur aux termes de la
présente loi, l’employeur ou son représentant peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix
jours de l’envoi par la poste de l’avis d’évaluation, en appeler au ministre
pour demander que soit reconsidérée l’obligation de verser un montant ou le
montant ainsi évalué.
[...]
(5) Saisi d’une
demande ou d’un appel aux termes, du présent article, le ministre arrête,
avec toute la diligence voulue, la question soulevée par la demande ou
annule, confirme ou modifie l’évaluation, ou fait une réévaluation, et il en
avise dès lors tout employé intéressé ou son représentant ainsi que
l’employeur ou son représentant.
|
Subsection 28 (1)
|
28. (1) An employee or employer affected by a
determination by or a decision on an appeal to the Minister under section 27,
or the representative of either of them, may, within ninety days after the
determination or decision is communicated to that employee or employer, or
within such longer time as the Tax Court of Canada on application made to it
within those ninety days may allow, appeal from the determination or decision
to that Court by sending a notice of appeal in prescribed form by registered
mail to the Registry of that Court.
|
28. (1) Un
employé ou un employeur visé par l’arrêt du ministre ou par sa décision sur
l’appel que prévoit l’article 27, ou son représentant, peut, dans les
quatre-vingt-dix jours qui suivent la date à laquelle l’arrêt ou la décision
lui est communiquée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire que la Cour canadienne
de l’ímpôt peut accorder sur demande qui lui est présentée dans les
quatre-vingt-dix jours, en appeler de l’arrêt ou de la décision en question
auprès de cette Cour en envoyant un avis d’appel dans la forme prescrite par
courrier recommandé au greffe de la Cour.
|
Subsection 29 (1)
|
29. (1) The Minister has authority to decide any
question of fact or law necessary to be decided in determining any question
or reconsidering any assessment required to be determined or reconsidered
under section 27 and to decide whether an employee or employer may be or is
affected thereby.
|
29. (1) Le
ministre a le pouvoir de décider toute question de fait ou de droit qui doit
être tranchée, en arrêtant une question quelconque ou en examinant de nouveau
une évaluation dont l’arrêt ou la reconsidération est exigé par l’article 27,
et de décider si un employé ou un employeur est ou peut être visé de ce fait.
|
APPENDIX C
Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-8 (current version)
Subsection 22 (1) and (2)
|
22. (1) The Minister may assess an employer
for an amount payable by him under this Act, or may re-assess the employer or
make additional assessments as the circumstances require, and the expression
“assessment” when used in this Act with reference to any action so taken by
the Minister under this section includes any such re-assessment or additional
assessment.
(2) After assessing an employer for an
amount payable by him under this Act, the Minister shall send the employer a
notice of assessment, and on that notice being sent to the employer, the
assessment shall be deemed to be valid and binding, subject to being varied
or vacated on appeal under this Act, and the employer is liable to pay to Her
Majesty the amount thereof forthwith.
|
22. (1) Le
ministre peut évaluer le montant payable par un employeur aux termes de la
présente loi ou il peut réévaluer ce montant à l’égard de cet employeur ou
établir des évaluations supplémentaires selon que les circonstances l’exigent ;
l’expression «évaluation », utilisée dans la présente loi relativement à
toute initiative ainsi prise par le ministre en vertu du présent article,
s’entend également d’une nouvelle évaluation ou d’une évaluation
supplémentaire.
(2) Après avoir évalué le montant
payable par un employeur aux termes de la présente loi, le ministre envoie à
l’employeur un avis d’évaluation; dès l’envoi de cet avis à l’employeur,
l’évaluation est réputée valide et obligatoire sous réserve de modification
ou d’annulation sur appel prévu par la présente loi et l’employeur est tenu
d’en payer sans délai le montant à Sa Majesté.
|
Subsection 23 (2)
|
23. (2) Section
160, subsections 161(11) and 220(3.1), (4) and (5), sections 221.1 and 223 to
224.3, subsections 227(9.1) and (10), sections 229, 236 and 244 (except
subsections 244(1) and (4)) and subsections 248(7) and (11) of the Income
Tax Act apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, in
relation to all contributions, interest, penalties and other amounts payable
by a person under this Act, and for the purposes of this subsection,
(a) the reference
in subsection 224(1.2) of that Act to “subsection 227(10.1) or a similar
provision” shall be read as a reference to “section 22 of the Canada
Pension Plan”; and
(b) subsection
224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act shall apply to employer’s
contributions, employee’s contributions, and related interest, penalties or
other amounts, subject to subsections 69(1) and 69.1(1) of the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act and section 11.09 of the Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act.
|
23. (2) L’article
160, les paragraphes 161(11) et 220(3.1), (4) et (5), les articles 221.1 et
223 à 224.3, les paragraphes 227(9.1) et (10), les articles 229, 236 et 244
(sauf les paragraphes 244(1) et (4)) et les paragraphes 248(7) et (11) de la Loi
de l’impôt sur le revenu s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires,
aux cotisations, intérêts, pénalités et autres montants payables par une personne
en vertu de la présente loi. Pour l’application du présent paragraphe :
a) le passage
« du paragraphe 227(10.1) ou d’une disposition semblable » au
paragraphe 224(1.2) de cette loi vaut mention de « de l’article 22 du Régime
de pensions du Canada »;
b) le
paragraphe 224(1.2) de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu s’applique aux
cotisations d’employeur, aux cotisations d’employé et aux intérêts, pénalités
ou autres sommes afférents, sous réserve des paragraphes 69(1) et 69.1(1) de
la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité et de l’article 11.09 de la Loi
sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies.
|
Section 27.1
|
27.1 An employer
who has been assessed under section 22 may appeal to the Minister for a
reconsideration of the assessment, either as to whether an amount should be
assessed as payable or as to the amount assessed, within 90 days after being
notified of the assessment.
|
27.1 Lorsqu’une
somme payable par lui a été évalué par le ministre au titre de l’article 22,
l’employeur peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la date à laquelle
il reçoit l’avis d’évaluation, demander au ministre de réviser l’évaluation
quant à la question de savoir s’il y a matière à évaluation ou quel devrait
être le montant de celle-ci.
|
Section 27.2
|
27.2 (1) Where an
appeal is made to the Minister under section 27 or 27.1, the Minister shall
(a) notify any
person who may be affected by the appeal that the Minister intends to decide
the appeal, including the Minister of Social Development in the case of an
appeal of a ruling; and
(b) give the
person an opportunity to provide information and to make representations to
protect the person’s interests, as the circumstances require.
(2) An appeal shall be addressed to the
Assistant Director of Appeals in a Tax Services Office of the Canada Revenue
Agency and delivered or mailed to that office.
(3) The Minister shall decide the
appeal within a reasonable time after receiving it and shall notify the
affected persons of the decision in any manner that the Minister considers
adequate.
|
27.2 (1) Le
ministre notifie son intention de régler la question relative à l’appel ou à
la révision à tous les intéressés, y compris le
ministre du Développement social dans
les cas visés aux articles 27 ou 27.1; il leur donne également, selon le
besoin, la possibilité de fournir des renseignements et de présenter des
observations pour protéger leurs intérêts.
(2) Les demandes d’appel et de révision
sont adressées au directeur adjoint des Appels d’un bureau des services
fiscaux de l’Agence du revenu du Canada et sont livrées à ce bureau ou y sont
expédiées par la poste.
(3) Le ministre règle la question
soulevée par l’appel ou la demande de révision dans les meilleurs délais et
notifie le résultat aux intéressés de la manière qu’il juge adéquate.
|
Subsection 28 (1)
|
28. (1) A
person affected by a decision on an appeal to the Minister under section 27
or 27.1, or the person’s representative, may, within 90 days after the
decision is communicated to the person, or within any longer time that the
Tax Court of Canada on application made to it within 90 days after the
expiration of those 90 days allows, appeal from the decision to that Court in
accordance with the Tax Court of Canada Act and the applicable rules
of court made thereunder.
|
28. (1) La
personne visée par la décision du ministre sur l’appel que prévoit les
articles 27 ou 27.1, ou son représentant, peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix
jours qui suivent la date à laquelle la décision lui est communiquée, ou dans
le délai supplémentaire que la Cour canadienne de l’impôt peut accorder sur
demande qui lui est présentée dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant
l’expiration de ces quatre-vingt-dix jours, en appeler de la décision en
question auprès de cette Cour en conformité avec la Loi sur la Cour
canadienne de l’impôt et les règles de cour applicables prises en vertu
de cette loi.
|
Subsection 29 (2)
|
29.
(2)
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the decision of the Minister or the
Tax Court of Canada of an appeal under section 27, 27.1 or 28 and a ruling of
an authorized officer under section 26.1 is final and binding for all
purposes of this Act.
|
29.
(2)
Sauf disposition contraire de la présente loi, toute décision prise par la
Cour ou le ministre aux termes des articles 27, 27.1 ou 28, de même que toute
décision prise par un fonctionnaire en vertu de l’article 26.1, est
définitive et obligatoire pour tout ce qui touche à la présente loi.
|
APPENDIX D
Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1, in effect before
June 30, 1996
Subsection 56 (1), (2) and (4)
|
56. (1) The Minister may assess an employer for an
amount payable by him under this Act, or may reassess that employer or make
such additional assessments as the circumstances require, and the expression
“assessment” when used in this Act with reference to any action so taken by
the Minister under this section includes that reassessment or additional
assessment.
(2) After assessing an employer for an amount
payable by him under this Act, the Minister shall send the employer a notice
of assessment, and on that notice being sent to the employer the assessment
shall be deemed to be valid and binding subject to being vacated or varied on
appeal under this Act, and the employer is liable to pay
to Her Majesty the amount thereof forthwith.
...
(4) The day of mailing of a notice of
assessment described in subsection (2) shall, in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, be deemed to be the day appearing from the notice to be the
date thereof unless called in question by the Minister or by a person acting
for him or for Her Majesty.
|
56. (1) Le
ministre peut établir une évaluation initiale, une évaluation révisée ou, au
besoin, des évaluations complémentaires de ce que doit payer un employeur, et
le mot « évaluation », lorsqu’íl est utilisé dans la présente loi
pour désigner une initiative ainsi prise par le ministre en vertu du présent
article, s’entend également de l’évaluation révisée ou complémentaire.
(2) Après toute
évaluation d’une somme payable par un employeur en vertu de la présente loi,
le ministre lui envoie un avis d’évaluation. Dès l’envoi de cet avis, l’évaluation
est réputée valide et obligatoire sous réserve de modification ou
d’annulation sur appel prévu par la présente loi, et l’employeur est tenu de
payer
immédiatement à Sa
Majesté la somme indiquée.
[...]
(4) La date
d’expédition par la poste d’un avis d’évaluation visé au paragraphe (2) est
réputée, à défaut de preuve contraire, être la date qui, au vu de cet avis,
paraît être la date d’expédition, sauf si elle est contestée par le ministre
ou par une personne agissant pour lui ou pour Sa Majesté.
|
Subsection 61 (2) and (6)
|
61. (2) Where the Minister has assessed an
employer for an amount payable by him under this Act, the employer may appeal
to the Minister for a reconsideration of the assessment, either as to whether
any amount should be assessed as payable or as to the amount so assessed,
within ninety days of the day of mailing of the notice of assessment.
...
(6) On an application or an appeal under this
section, the Minister shall, with all due despatch, determine the question
raised by the application or vacate, confirm or vary the assessment, or
reassess, and he shall thereupon notify any person affected.
|
61. (2)
Lorsque le ministre a évalué une somme payable par un employeur en vertu de
la présente loi, l’employeur peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours de la date
d’expédition par la poste de l’avis d’évaluation, demander au ministre de
reconsidérer l’évaluation, quant à la question de savoir s’il y a matière à
évaluation ou quel devrait être le montant de l’évaluation.
[...]
(6) À la suite d’une
demande faite en vertu du présent article, le ministre doit, avec toute la
diligence voulue, soit régler la question soulevée par la demande, soit
annuler, confirmer ou modifier l’évaluation, ou la réviser, et notifier le
résultat à toute personne concernée.
|
Subsection 70 (1)
|
70. (1) The Commission or a person affected by a
determination by, or a decision on an appeal to, the Minister under section
61 may, within ninety days after the determination or decision is
communicated to him, or within such longer time as the Tax Court of Canada on
application made to it within those ninety days may allow, appeal from the
determination or decision to that Court in the manner prescribed.
|
70. (1) La
Commission ou une personne que concerne le règlement d’une question par le
ministre ou une décision sur appel au ministre, en vertu de l’article 61,
peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours de la communication du règlement ou de
la décision ou dans le délai supplémentaire que peut accorder la Cour
canadienne de l’impôt sur demande à elle présentée dans ces quatre-vingt-dix
jours, interjeter appel devant la Cour canadienne de l’impôt de la manière prescrite.
|
Subsection 71 (1)
|
71. (1) The Minister and the Tax Court of Canada
have authority to decide any question of fact or law necessary to be decided
in determining any question or reconsidering any assessment required to be
determined or reconsidered under section 61 or 70 and to decide whether a
person may be or is affected thereby, and, except as provided in this Act,
the decision of the Minister, or the decision of the Tax Court of Canada, as
the case may be, is final and binding for all purposes of this Act.
|
71. (1) Le
ministre et la Cour canadienne de l’impôt ont le pouvoir de décider toute
question de fait ou de droit qu’il est nécessaire de décider pour régler une
question ou reconsidérer une évaluation qui doit être réglée ou reconsidérée
en vertu des articles 61 ou 70, ainsi que de décider si une personne est ou
peut être concernée et, sauf disposition contraire de la présente loi, la
décision du ministre ou de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt, selon le cas, est
définitive et obligatoire à toutes les fins de la présente loi.
|
APPENDIX E
Employment Insurance Act, S.C., 1996, c. 23, (current version)
Subsection 85 (1), (2) and (4)
|
85. (1) The
Minister may assess an employer for an amount payable by the employer under
this Act, or may reassess the employer or make such additional assessments as
the circumstances require, and the expression “assessment” when used in this
Act with reference to any action so taken by the Minister under this section
includes a reassessment or an additional assessment.
(2) After assessing an employer for an
amount payable under this Act, the Minister shall send the employer a notice
of assessment, and when the notice is sent the assessment is valid and
binding subject to being vacated or varied on appeal under this Act, and the
employer is liable to pay the amount to Her Majesty without delay.
...
(4) The day of mailing of a notice of
assessment described in subsection (2) is, in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, deemed to be the day appearing from the notice to be the date
of the notice unless called into question by the Minister or by a person
acting for the Minister or for Her Majesty.
|
85. (1) Le
ministre peut établir une évaluation initiale, une évaluation révisée ou, au
besoin, des évaluations complémentaires de ce que doit payer un employeur, et
le mot « évaluation », lorsqu’il est utilisé dans la présente loi
pour désigner une initiative ainsi prise par le ministre en vertu du présent
article, s’entend également de l’évaluation révisée ou complémentaire.
(2) Après toute évaluation d’une somme
payable par un employeur en vertu de la présente loi, le ministre lui envoie
un avis d’évaluation. Dès l’envoi de cet avis, l’évaluation est réputée
valide et obligatoire sous réserve de modification ou d’annulation sur appel
prévu par la présente loi, et l’employeur est tenu de payer immédiatement à
Sa Majesté la somme indiquée.
[...]
(4) La date d’expédition par la poste
d’un avis d’évaluation visé au paragraphe (2) est réputée, à défaut de preuve
contraire, être la date qui, au vu de cet avis, paraît être la date
d’expédition, sauf si elle est contestée par le ministre ou par une personne
agissant pour lui ou pour Sa Majesté.
|
Section 92
|
92. An employer
who has been assessed under section 85 may appeal to the Minister for a
reconsideration of the assessment, either as to whether an amount should be
assessed as payable or as to the amount assessed, within 90 days after being
notified of the assessment.
|
92. Lorsque le
ministre a évalué une somme payable par un employeur au titre de l’article
85, l’employeur peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la date à
laquelle il reçoit l’avis d’évaluation, demander au ministre de reconsidérer
l’évaluation quant à la question de savoir s’il y a matière à évaluation ou
quel devrait être le montant de celle-ci.
|
Subsection 93 (3)
|
93. (3) The
Minister shall decide the appeal within a reasonable time after receiving it
and shall notify the affected persons of the decision.
|
93. (3) Le
ministre règle la question soulevée par l’appel ou la demande de révision
dans les meilleurs délais et notifie le résultat aux personnes concernées.
|
Section 99
|
99. Section 160,
subsections 161(11) and 220(3.1), sections 221.1 and 224 to 224.3 and
subsections 227(9.1) and (10) and 248(7) and (11) of the Income Tax Act
apply to all premiums, interest, penalties and other amounts payable by a
person under this Part and Part VII.1, with the modifications that the
circumstances require, and for the purposes of this section,
(a) the reference
in subsection 224(1.2) of that Act to “subsection 227(10.1) or a similar
provision” is to be read as a reference to “section 85 or 152. 24, as the
case may be, of the Employment Insurance Act”; and
(b) subsection
224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act applies to employer’s premiums,
employee’s premiums, and premiums under Part VII.1, and related interest,
penalties or other amounts, subject to subsections 69(1) and 69.1(1) of the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act and section 11.09 of the Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act.
|
99. L’article
160, les paragraphes 161(11) et 220(3.1), les articles 221.1 et 224 à 224.3
et les paragraphes 227(9.1) et (10) et 248(7) et (11) de la Loi de l’impôt
sur le revenu s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, aux cotisations,
intérêts, pénalités et autres sommes payables par une personne en vertu de la
présente partie ou de la partie VII.1. Pour l’application du présent
article :
a) le passage «
du paragraphe 227(10.1) ou d’une disposition semblable » au paragraphe 224(1.2)
de cette loi vaut mention de « de l’article 85 ou 152.24, selon le cas,
de la Loi sur l’assurance-emploi »;
b) le
paragraphe 224(1.2) de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu s’applique aux
cotisations patronales, aux cotisations ouvrières, aux cotisations prévues
par la partie VII.1 et aux intérêts, pénalités ou autres sommes afférents,
sous réserve des paragraphes 69(1) et 69.1(1) de la Loi sur la faillite et
l’insolvabilité et de l’article 11.09 de la Loi sur les arrangements
avec les créanciers des compagnies.
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Subsection 103 (1)
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103. (1) The
Commission or a person affected by a decision on an appeal to the Minister
under section 91 or 92 may appeal from the decision to the Tax Court of
Canada in accordance with the Tax Court of Canada Act and the
applicable rules of court made thereunder within 90 days after the decision
is communicated to the Commission or the person, or within such longer time
as the Court allows on application made to it within 90 days after the
expiration of those 90 days.
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103. (1) La
Commission ou une personne que concerne une décision rendue au titre de
l’article 91 ou 92, peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la
communication de la décision ou dans le délai supplémentaire que peut
accorder la Cour canadienne de l’impôt sur demande à elle présentée dans les
quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant l’expiration de ces quatre-vingt-dix jours,
interjeter appel devant la Cour canadienne de l’impôt de la manière prévue
par la Loi sur la Cour canadienne de l’impôt et les règles de cour
applicables prises en vertu de cette loi.
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Subsection 104 (1) and (2)
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104. (1) The Tax
Court of Canada and the Minister have authority to decide any question of
fact or law necessary to be decided in the course of an appeal under section
91 or 103 or to reconsider an assessment under section 92 and to decide
whether a person may be or is affected
by the decision or assessment.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in
this Act, a decision of the Tax Court of Canada or the Minister and a ruling
of an authorized officer under section 90 are final and binding for all
purposes of this Act.
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104. (1) La Cour
canadienne de l’impôt et le ministre ont le pouvoir de décider toute question
de fait ou de droit qu’il est nécessaire de décider pour rendre une décision
au titre de l’article 91 ou 103 ou pour reconsidérer une évaluation qui doit
l’être au titre de l’article 92, ainsi que de décider si une personne est ou
peut être concernée par la décision ou l’évaluation.
(2) Sauf disposition contraire de la
présente loi, la décision de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt, du ministre ou du
fonctionnaire autorisé au titre de l’article 90, selon le cas, est définitive
et obligatoire à toutes les fins de la présente loi.
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Section 155
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155. The Unemployment
Insurance Act is repealed.
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155. La Loi sur
lássurance-chômage est abrogée.
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Section 161
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161. All matters
relating to the payment of premiums under the former Act shall be dealt with
under that Act.
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161. Les questions
relatives au versement de cotisations payables au titre de l’ancienne loi
sont traitées conformément à celle-ci.
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Subsection 190 (1)
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190. (1) Except as
otherwise provided in this section, this Act comes into force on June 30,
1996.
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190. (1) Sous
réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, la présente loi entre en
vigueur le 30 juin 1996.
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