Federal Courts Act

A county sheriff who is made, in effect, an officer of the Federal Court by virtue of s. 13(2), is not thereby made a servant of the Crown in right of Canada for the purpose of s. 17(4)(b) of the Federal Court.

The Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench had no jurisdiction to make a determination as to who had the right to funds already paid to Revenue Canada pursuant to s. 224 demand.

The Federal Court had no jurisdiction to declare that waivers, which allegedly had been extracted from the taxpayer under compulsion and duress, were void. "[T]here is no reason which grounds for invalidity cannot be given full effect and proceedings appealing the reassessments."

The Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application seeking to prohibit the Minister from performing further audits of the taxpayer for the taxation years in question and from continuing his practice of issuing two employer remittance forms.

It was not proper for the Queen to be a defendant.

The decision of the Minister of Communications to revoke a certification of a certified production previously given under Regulation 1104(2) could not be reviewed under section 18 of the Federal Court Act.

The applicant, who was a judgment creditor of a company ("Polar"), had no standing to quash assessment and enforcement proceedings by the Minister on the ground that the Minister had made the assessments without jurisdiction. Walsh, J. stated that in order to decide that the applicant had a proprietary interest in the funds which had been seized, and accordingly had a sufficient interest to acquire standing, "would involve a decision that the seizure by the Minister was unlawful and applicant Hart cannot acquire standing on the basis of an assumption that the Minister's action in making the seizure was unlawful."

A motion pursuant to s. 18 of the Federal Court Act to quash an application by a Departmental employee pursuant to s. 231(2) for the retention of documents did not constitute a collateral attack on the order of Judge Street made pursuant to that application.

The provincial superior courts have at least coordinate jurisdiction with the Federal Court in Charter matters, and should not defer to the Federal Court in Charter matters.

Two co-owners paid a portion of the expropriation proceeds received for one of their properties to their affiliated tenant of that property. However, when CRA treated that receipt in the tenant’s hands as a s. 9 receipt, rather than as a s. 12(1)(x) receipt that was eligible for the s. 13(7.4) election, the two co-owners and the tenant requested CRA (within the normal reassessment period) to amend their returns for the year of expropriation to treat the amount that had been paid to the tenant not as income to the tenant but instead as capital gains realized by the co-owners. CRA essentially refused this request. The taxpayers considered it to be unfair that CRA had not issued any reassessment that they could appeal, and applied for an order of mandamus compelling CRA to reassess in some manner.

Walker J found that the refusal of CRA to reassess was a decision that could be subject to judicial review (e.g., if the decision was unreasonable) – although, of course, the substantive question of whether the requested adjustment was correct could not be reviewed by her. However, this decision was not before her because their application had not been brought on a timely basis and the criteria for extending the 30-day period for bringing such an application had not been made out.

In any event, CRA had no legal obligation to issue a reassessment notice following the taxpayer request – that was a decision that was within its discretion (s. 152(4) used the word “may”).

The Attorney General brought both an appeal pursuant to s. 68(1) of the Customs Act regarding alleged errors of law in an order of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal and an application for judicial review regarding the alleged unreasonableness of such order.

In discussing the issue as to whether s. 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act precluded the judicial review application given the statutory appeal mechanism, Boivin JA adopted the finding in inter alia Best Buy (2021 FCA 161) that in such circumstances, “a complete bar to judicial review would be incompatible with the rule of law” and that both types of errors are reviewable: “errors of law are reviewable under the correctness standard via the statutory appeal mechanism in subsection 68(1) of the Customs Act, while errors of fact are reviewable under the reasonableness standard through an application for judicial review …” (para. 29).

After dismissing both the appeal and the application, Boivin JA went on to state (at para. 52):

The better approach to reflect Parliament’s intent and the rule of law might be the more restrictive stance adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which reiterates that “judicial review is always available,” but mandates that courts ask themselves whether it is an “appropriate” exercise of their discretion, adding that this is so only in “rare cases” (Yatar [2022 ONCA 446, leave granted]).

Rennie JA (in reversing the Court below) found that the application of the respondent (“Iris”) should be struck out. He made the overall comments (at para. 6) that the application was “in essence, a collateral challenge to the validity of the assessments issued under the ETA, a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court…” and (at para. 17) that “[a]n allegation that the Minister acted improperly in issuing the assessment does nothing to change the assessment.” Such application had sought declarations that:

• Iris was denied procedural fairness in the audit and assessment process by inter alia prior CRA policies not being followed - as to which Rennie JA stated (at para. 10):

Departures from prior policy may give rise to legitimate expectations arguments, but they cannot make a decision to assess or the assessment itself, invalid. The Minister is bound to apply the ETA irrespective of policy considerations.

• The assessments were made without an evidentiary foundation - as to which Rennie JA stated (at para. 11): “Whether the assessment made by the Minister is sustained by the evidence is a question precisely within the legislative mandate of the Tax Court of Canada.”
• The assessments were issued for the improper purpose of depriving the Federal Court of jurisdiction to hear administrative law grievances raised by Iris - as to which Rennie JA noted (at para. 13) that “where the true purpose of the application is to seek practical relief against the exercise of a discretion, the bar in section 18.5 does not apply” – but went on to indicate that such was not the case here.

After noting (at para. 18) that the Court should not exercise its discretion in making a declaration that will not “have any real or practical effect,” he further stated (also at para. 18):

The assessment remains valid and binding until vacated by the Tax Court. Issuing a declaration that does not quash or vacate the assessments would serve little or no purpose … .

The Minister reassessed the 2006 taxation year of the (Canadian-resident) taxpayer (“Dow”) by adding 307 million in a transfer-pricing adjustment, but did not allow a requested “downward” adjustment under s. 247(10) (to increase the interest expense on a loan from a Swiss affiliate by $3.26 million) because of a limitation period in the Canada-Switzerland Tax Treaty. The taxpayer appealed the 2006 reassessment on the basis that such determination was not proper, but also launched a protective application for judicial review of that determination to the Federal Court. The parties posed a question under Rule 58 as to whether the decision to deny the downward adjustment was outside the exclusive original jurisdiction granted to the Tax Court under TCCA s. 12.

In reversing the decision below and in finding that such a decision could be reviewed only by the Federal Court, Webb JA agreed with the Tax Court that s. 247(11) does not provide for a separate right of appeal from the Minister’s opinion under s. 247(10) that a downward adjustment is inappropriate, and then stated (at para. 40):

The determination that this opinion does not give rise to a separate right of appeal leads to the conclusion that the ITA does not expressly provide an appeal of this decision. Since section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act only excludes the Federal Court from reviewing a decision when another Act expressly provides a right of appeal, this determination would lead to the finding that section 18.5 … is not a bar to the Federal Court judicially reviewing this decision of the Minister.

The appellant (Iris) appealed a Federal Court order, dismissing its request for mandamus to compel the release of $21.85 million in GST/HST tax refunds pending the conclusion of an on-going audit and assessment.

At the outset of the appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Minister was granted permission to file the affidavit of a CRA official indicating that Iris’ net tax for the relevant reporting periods had now been assessed and there was no net tax refund owing.

In going on to find that Iris’ appeal, in the light of this affidavit, should now be dismissed as moot, Rennie JA stated (at paras. 7, 9):

The assessments are determinative of Iris’ net tax liability until the Minister makes a reassessment or the assessment is vacated by the Tax Court (ss. 299(4), 301(1.1), 306 and 309 of the ETA). …

… When the true character of the relief sought in this case is considered, the request for payment of the refund is an attempt to short-circuit the recourse mechanisms established by Parliament. There is no credible basis on which it can be argued that this Court can compel the payment of the refunds claimed in the face of an assessment that the refunds are not owing. The request, in effect, asks for an order which is expressly contrary to the legislation.

After a lengthy audit, CRA concluded that the applicant (Newave) had been generating false ITC claims based on fabricated records, and issued a 30-day letter (subsequently extended to 60 days) proposing to deny the ITC claims and gave Newave 30 days to respond (subsequently extended to a total of 60 days). Counsel for the applicant demanded that all documents reviewed or relied upon by CRA be disclosed in order that it could make “fulsome” representations before any reassessments were made. CRA orally refused to provide such disclosure on June 2, 2021, and on June 7, 2021 informed Newave that it would be deregistered as of March 31, 2021. CRA issued Notices of Reassessment dated June 10, 2021 for approximately $72 million. Newave made two applications for judicial review (one shortly before, and one shortly after the Reassessments) challenging CRA’s decisions on June 2, 2021, not to provide disclosure and additional time for submissions, and (in the case of the second application) its decision to issue the Reassessments. Newave also sought a stay of any collection action by CRA and of deregistration of Newave, both pending the disposition of the applications for judicial review.

After dismissing the stay applications, Little J went on to grant the Crown’s application to strike out the applications, stating (regarding the first application, at paras. 129, 131, 142, 144, 148):

[T]he essential character of the first Notice of Application is intimately bound up with the correctness of the Reassessments or, more precisely, with the applicant’s attempt to impugn the correctness or validity of CRA’s assessment position in its proposal letter, as later reflected in the Reassessments. …

[T]he applicant seeks disclosure to attempt to undermine CRA’s assessing position – which forms the basis for both the proposal letter and the Reassessments. …

The applicant … did not provide any analysis of Baker [[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817] factors suggesting that procedural fairness at the audit stage, following a CRA proposal letter, required disclosure of the underlying CRA analysis and other documents. …

[T]he real goals of the applicant’s first Notice of Application were not to remedy alleged procedural fairness concerns, but instead were to halt and attempt to control CRA’s reassessment process. … In substance, the content of the pleading is an attempt to interfere with the Minister’s statutory duty to assess. …

[A]ny allegations about procedural fairness at the audit stage can be remedied at the objection or appeal stage… .

Before also allowing the motion to strike the second application, he stated (at para. 157):

[T]he second Notice of Application is an improper challenge to the Reassessments in the guise of a judicial review application. Any such attack on the merits of the Reassessments, or the facts and law on which they are based, must be done under the processes in the Excise Tax Act… .

The taxpayer, who left Canada for Chad in 2004 (followed by a stint in Iraq) and returned to Canada in January 2010, filed a voluntary disclosure application in July 2015 pursuant to which he filed tax returns for 2004 and 2010 to 2014 – but not for 2005 to 2009, taking the position that for those years he was a non-resident. On March 3, 2016, CRA sent a letter to him stating that it had determined that the taxpayer was a “factual resident following [his] departure from Canada on June 30, 2004.” Following representations by the taxpayer, the Minister confirmed this position by an April 25, 2018 letter.

The taxpayer applied for judicial review of the April 25, 2018 letter on the grounds that the determination was unreasonable and breached the duty of fairness. The Prothonotary had struck the taxpayer’s application on the grounds that it was premature (as the voluntary disclosure application was still outstanding, no determination had been made under s. 220(3.1)), and the Minister’s factual determination of residency could be challenged by filing tax returns for those years (which had not yet been done) and appealing assessments thereof to the Tax Court.

In confirming this decision of the Prothonotary, McVeigh J stated (at paras. 23. 27, 29):

[A]n initial residency letter should not be reviewable. This is because courts should not interfere with “ongoing administrative processes until after they are completed, or until the available, effective remedies are exhausted” absent “exceptional circumstances” (Canada (Border Services Agency) v C.B. Powell Ltd., at para 31). …

[H]e cannot judicially review this particular tax process when there has been no assessment and no discretionary decision. …

Once the assessments are issued by CRA and if the Appellant wishes to file an objection and appeal, then the Tax Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with whether he is a resident of Canada or not.

The applicant transferred $300,000 to a Bahamas bank account in 1978. In order to put his affairs in order for his heirs, he made a voluntary disclosure for his 2005 to 2014 taxation years (i.e., all the years within the 10-year period permitted by s. 220(3.1)), which was accepted by CRA, so that penalties were waived and interest relief provided for those taxation years. 14 months later, CRA on the basis of the information provided under this voluntary disclosure began a review of the applicant’s 1980 to 2004 taxation years with a view to including of unreported income and assessing penalties for failure to file T1135s for those years.

The taxpayer noted that it was contrary to CRA’s practices to go back before a period covered by a voluntary disclosure where there was insufficient documentation respecting the earlier periods, and sought an injunction prohibiting CRA from reassessing him for the earlier years. In refusing this request, Martineau J indicated that, under ss. 165(3) and 171, the Tax Court had the power to cancel an assessment, and stated:

…The public interest — i.e. the orderly application of the ITA — takes precedence here over the financial and other inconveniences that the applicant may face by having, like all taxpayers, to follow the normal challenge procedure set out in the ITA.

The applicant objected to the denial of his claim to the Ontario new housing HST rebate, and he then accepted a CRA offer to refund the difference between his claim and amounts previously credited to him. When CRA tried to implement this settlement agreement, it discovered that the applicant was not entitled to any further rebate as he had purchased the house before the relevant entitlement date (June 18, 2009), and did not further reassess the applicant's return in breach of the agreement. The applicant filed an application under the Federal Court Act for enforcement of the settlement agreement.

In finding that he lacked the jurisdiction to consider the application, Gascon J stated (at para. 22) that "the essential nature and character of Mr. Sood's claim in this judicial review application is a collateral attack on the validity of the tax reassessment made by the Minister."

See summary under ETA s. 296(1).

The taxpayer claimed that it did not learn about a reassessment allegedly mailed on November 7, 2008 until April 14, 2010. When its Notice of Objection dated June 7, 2010 was rejected on grounds of untimeliness, it obtained a decision of the Federal Court (2013 FC 1192) setting aside the decision of the Minister not to consider the objection.

In reversing this judgment, Dawson J.A. noted that s. 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act insulates a decision from judicial review if there is an express right of appeal to the Tax Court, and stated (at para. 8):

[C]onocoPhillips' proper recourse was to commence an appeal to the Tax Court under paragraph 169(1)(b) of the Act and to demonstrate in that appeal that its notice of objection was filed on a timely basis. It is within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to determine whether the notice of reassessment was in fact mailed as the Minister alleges. This it will do on a full evidentiary record with regard to the statutory presumption found in subsection 244(14) of the Act (which presumes a notice of reassessment to have been mailed on its date). See: Walker v. Canada, 2005 FCA 393, 344 N.R. 169, at paragraphs 11 to 13. It is open to ConocoPhillips to request that the question of the timeliness of its notice of objection be determined before the trial pursuant to Rule 58(1)…

In the course of an audit, the Minister mailed the taxpayer some draft assessments proposing to disallow certain of the taxpayer's claimed deductions in prior years. The taxpayer applied for judicial review of the Minister's "decision" to proceed with the issuance of notices of reassessment.

R Morneau, prothonotary, granted the Minister's motion to strike the taxpayer's application. He stated (at paras. 22-24):

...ColasCanada is challenging draft assements and not formally issued assessments. ... [T]heoretically, the objection and appeal regime under the [ITA] is still not open or available and section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act ... cannot in theory be raised to preclude the notice of application.

However, and as asked in JP Morgan ... , does this mean that the taxpayer can proceed to Federal Court?

As set out in JP Morgan [at para. 84], the answer to this question is no because later, if and when draft assessments materialize into actual assessments, the TCC's objection and appeal regime will come into play ... :

... A judicial review brought in the face of adequate, effective recourse elsewhere or at another time cannot be entertained [R Morneau's emphasis].

The taxpayer settled an employment dispute with the Department of Justice, under which she was entitled to liquidated damages. The Department erroneously issued a T4 slip, and consequently CRA assessed the taxpayer on the basis that the liquidated damages were income from employment. The taxpayer neglected to file a notice of objection, but instead pursued the cancellation of the T4 slip. She applied to the Court for a declaration that the T4 was issued in error, and a writ of mandamus for the Minister to issue an amended T4.

Harrington J found that the taxpayer's application was an impermissible collateral attack on the Tax Court's jurisdiction, and he had no authority to make the requested order. He suggested, however, that it would be right for the Minister to acquiesce, as the T4 was clearly erroneous.

The 2002 to 2008 taxation years of the taxpayer were assessed for its failure to withhold Part XIII tax. The taxpayer (in addition to objecting under s. 165) sought to have the assessments for the earlier (2002-2004) years set aside, on an application for judicial review in the Federal Court, on the basis that it was contrary to the Minister's policy to go back more than two years on audit.

Stratas JA found that each of the following grounds was a sufficient basis for dismissing the application:

• the notice of application failed to state a "cognizable administrative law claim," as "changes in policies or departures from policies...do not constitute an abuse of discretion..." (para. 75, similarly para. 108);
• the Federal Court was barred from considering the claim by s. 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, as ITA ss. 165 and 169 "constitute a complete appeal procedure that allows taxpayers to rise in the Tax Court all issues relating to the correctness of the assessments" (para. 82, similarly para. 110); and
• the Federal Court could not grant the relief sought: "If the 'essential character' of the relief sought is the setting aside of an assessment, it must be struck" (para. 93), as "only the Tax Court can grant this relief: subsection 152(8)" (para. 111).

Stratas JA gave (at para. 98) oversight of political or racial targeting through selective assessments as "examples of judicial reviews that might avoid the three objections to judicial review," and stated (at para. 101) that judicial review "is a tool of last resort."

A contract in 1880, backed by the CPR Act in 1881, exempted the taxpayer from virtually all forms of federal, provincial and municipal taxation. CPR applied to the Federal Court to recover fuel tax paid under the ETA and large corporations tax under the ITA, and for declarations that the government had no authority to collect such tax.

The Minister moved to strike the taxpayer's pleadings on the basis that they circumvented the Tax Court's authority. The pleadings were not an appeal from an assessment, but rather engaged broader concerns about the constitutionality of the impugned taxes. This was an appropriate matter for the Federal Court.

Blanchard J. found that the taxpayer was prevented under s. 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act from challenging, before the Federal Court, the legitimacy of the Minister's notice of confirmation under s. 165(3) of the ITA. The legal efficacy of a "key document" to a taxpayer's tax liability is within the exclusive purview of the Tax Court and appeals therefrom (paras. 26-27).

The taxpayer was successful in obtaining an order of mandamus directing the Minister to carry back a large capital loss it had reported in its 1988 income tax return to its three preceding taxation years. Revenue Canada then advised the taxpayer that it was reassessing those taxation years, but with no change to his taxable income for those years because the 1988 loss had been disallowed.

The Court was without jurisdiction to entertain an application by the taxpayer seeking declarations the substance of which would be to require the Minister to reassess the taxpayer for his 1985, 1986 and 1987 taxation years by allowing the deduction of the 1988 loss. Rothstein J., however, noted (at p. 5079) that if it "were an application for contempt, it might well be that the applicant could properly bring its complaint to this Court".

bcIMC was a BC Crown agent which was formed to manage and hold investments for the provincial pension plans. The governing Act created a statutory trust under which each pension plan only has an entitlement to units in the investment pools managed by bcIMC and does not have ownership in any investment pool assets. Willcock JA noted (at para 109) that “there is no clear beneficial interest in the pooled funds that is distinct from bcIMC’s legal interest.”

In the absence of an intergovernmental agreement under which the Province agreed that it and its agents would be liable for GST, the federal government would have been precluded by s. 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867 from effectively imposing federal tax on bcIMC by deeming services performed by it in relation to the investment pools to be taxable services.

However, he found that such immunity was taken away by the reciprocal taxation agreement between B.C. and Canada in which the Province committed itself and its agents to pay any tax imposed under the ETA. He stated that “agreements between the federal and provincial governments may be mere political agreements,” but found that the terms of the Agreement here evinced an intention to be legally bound, and stated that “enforcement of the [Agreement] is possible” pursuant to s. 19 of the Federal Court Act (Canada) and s. 1(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction Act (B.C.).

The only decision of the Tax Court pursuant to the informal procedure that may be reviewed under section 28 is a decision that disposes in whole or in part of the matters in issue on the appeal or otherwise finally affects an applicant's rights. Accordingly, the applicant could not seek a review of an order of the Tax Court setting down the date on which the applicant's tax appeal would be heard.

The Federal Court of Appeal was without jurisdiction to set aside the refusal of the Tax Court on an interlocutory application to vacate summarily on Charter grounds the income tax reassessments made against the taxpayer.

A decision of a Tax Court judge that two individual taxpayers had standing was merely a preliminary ruling enabling the Court to proceed to consider the substantive issue relating to the appeal against reassessments, and therefore was not reviewable on a section 28 application.

A decision of the Minister as to whether an article is exempt under subsection 29(1) of the Excise Tax Act is an administrative decision that must be exercised on a quasi-judicial basis.

The following criteria were formulated for the purpose of determining whether a decision or order is one required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis: (1) is the holding of a prior hearing impliedly contemplated? (2) does the decision or order directly or indirectly affect the rights and obligations of persons? (3) is the adversary process involved? (4) is there an obligation to apply substantive rules to many individual cases (as opposed to there being a broad policy mandate)?

The jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal does not extend to reviewing the decision or order of a federally-appointed provincial judge under s. 232 of the Act.

A statement of claim seeking a declaration that waivers "extracted" from the taxpayer were void and a writ of certiorari quashing the reassessments based thereon, was struck out on the basis that the relief claimed was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.

In dealing with the taxpayer's Statement of Claim which appealed from a decision of the Tax Court which, in turn, had quashed the appeal to that Court on the basis that the taxpayer (an Indian) had not filed a Notice of Objection, Giles A.S.P. noted that "it is now plain that any attempt to correct an assessment by use of sections 18 or 28 of the Federal Court Act is prohibited by section 29 of that Act" (p. 5373).

The Federal Court, Trial Division did not have the jurisdiction to entertain an originating motion brought by a taxpayer under section 18 of the Federal Court Act seeking writs of certiorari quashing decisions of the Minister to issue notices of assessment:

"Since the Act expressly provides for an appeal from assessments made by the Minister, it follows that section 29 of the Federal Court Act precludes not only applications under section 28 of the Act in respect of such assessments but also applications brought pursuant to section 18 ... to challenge not only the assessments per se but the collection proceedings or actions taken in respect of those deemed valid assessments." (p. 6652)

The Federal Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain a motion under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act to set aside a decertification order made by the Minister of Communications of videotaped programs because the question of the legality of the decertification order formed part and parcel of contemporaneous reassessments that have been made by the Minister of National Revenue of the applicants.

An application to dismiss the taxpayer's statement of claim, advancing a plea of non est factum in relation to waivers signed by the taxpayer, was dismissed, because there were "allegations of conduct which, if proved, might be found sufficiently venal to require the intervention of this Court."

An application for relief in the nature of certiorari to quash a determination by the Minister to assess a director pursuant to ss.227(1) and 227.1 was dismissed because the case was "on all fours with the Parsons case".

An assessment can only be reviewed and set aside by way of a regular appeal, and not pursuant to an application under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act, even where it is alleged that the Minister had no authority to make the assessment.

"In our opinion, section 29 clearly says that a decision which, under an Act of Parliament [here, the Customs Act], may be appealed to an authority mentioned in the section cannot, to the extent that it may be so appealed, be the subject of a section 28 [of the Federal Court Act] application. It follows that if the right of appeal is not limited, the decision may not be reviewed under section 28."

"The combined operation of the Federal Court Act and the Supreme Court Act is such that an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal must be brought before that Court or the Supreme Court within 60 days of the pronouncement of the judgment appealed from. The authority to extend this 60-day period rests with a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and not with the Supreme Court."

It was held that the plaintiff could call as a witness an officer of the Department of National Revenue and examine him as if he were a hostile witness, since this was an area of practice or evidence as contemplated by s. 46(1)(a)(v) which could be covered by the Federal Court Rules and was not, and which was addressed by an analogous rule of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

A proceeding against the Minister of National Revenue and the Tax Review Board is not a proceeding against the Crown.

The power to order a stay should only be exercised sparingly, and the possibility that expenses incurred in a proceeding may turn out to be useless because of a later decision that the Court had no jurisdiction is not sufficient ground to deprive plaintiffs of the advantages of advancing their action.

Evidence to establish the existence of an oral partnership between two Quebec taxpayers was admissible, notwithstanding that establishing the existence of such an oral contract was precluded by the Quebec Civil Code, because such evidence would have been admissible in the common law provinces, and s. 53(2) provides that evidence may be admitted if it would be admissible in any province.

The notice required by s. 57 is required even where a constitutional question is raised in an informal procedure in the Tax Court.